The proliferation of RTAs is a recognized feature of our time. While such agreements are permitted under Article XXIV of the GATT, this has not been without controversy and one aspect which remains unclear concerns the role decisions rendered by RTA dispute settlement bodies play in WTO cases. Are RTA dispute settlement systems in competition with and possibly even in contradiction to the WTO DSU or are they complementary? Can they co-exist or are they cast in eternal opposition? Are they equal or are they inherently subordinate to the WTO DSU? The article considers the WTO's treatment of RTAs in GATT and WTO case law, and weighs arguments for and against the consideration of RTA decisions by the DSB. The article submits that the DSB should not be blind to the equities of a situation where two states have reached an agreement in an RTA selecting dispute settlement under that body. This is more than a theoretical argument, it has happened, and the increasingly complex co-existence of the WTO with some 400 RTAs suggests that similar problems can arise in the future. Furthermore, these issues deserve a much more open and careful analysis than they have had to date.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of international dispute settlement procedures is a recognized feature of our time.
1 Some have viewed this phenomenon with alarm fearing the Recourse to dispute settlement plays a significant part in the law governing regional trade agreements (RTAs). Some 393 such agreements have been notified to the WTO 13 since the inception of the transparency procedure; 14 at least one hundred more are known to exist. 15 Almost without exception these agreements include some form of dispute settlement. In the majority of cases, these agreements 16 adopt a panel procedure based on the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) model. 17 In most cases, the process is weaker than the WTO DSU since the outcome is generally weaker than the compulsory and binding process of the WTO DSB. This may happen in several ways. RTA dispute settlement provisions often leave it up to the two state parties to determine how the panel decision is to be implemented. It may be possible for one party to frustrate the dispute settlement process by not naming their panelist. In some cases, the actual commitment to enter into dispute settlement may not be compulsory. Even where the decision is binding, as with Chapter 19 of NAFTA, there may be ways of challenging or prolonging the process. 18 The last decade has witnessed the emergence of a number of major 'regional' agreements made by significant groups of states. These range from the four MERCOSUR states 19 to the ten ASEAN states. 20 Other examples are the Andean Community of Nations, 21 the various African RTAs, 22 and the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area. 23 Still larger and more ambitious agreements are under negotiation in the form of a Trans-Pacific Partnership 24 or an eventual EU-USA FTA. 25 The most ambitious RTA, the European Union, has been profoundly influenced by the work of its Court of Justice, 26 a true court composed of 28 independent judges who have broad exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction to rule on a host of trade and related non-trade matters arising under European Union law. 27 What are we to make of the existence of these many dispute settlement procedures existing under various RTAs? Do they stand alone, relevant to their parties only, or are they part of a larger pattern of dispute settlement, which is emerging at the present time?
In particular, what is the relationship of these agreements to the WTO DSU?
At first blush, there is an extraordinary paradox in the fact that we have witnessed the development of many procedures in the same timeframe that has seen the emergence and consolidation of a considerable body of new substantive and procedural law under the WTO DSU, one of the few compulsory and binding procedures to exist in the world today. This is all the more extraordinary in that many of the legal issues arising under RTAs are similar in principle to those arising under the law of the WTO. Most RTAs affirm their fidelity to the law of the WTO or explicitly state that they should be interpreted in a manner conformable to that law. 28 This is true to the point that one can affirm that most RTAs, even the European Union in the trade sphere, have the same deep structure and are based on the same fundamental principles as the WTO. Yet, each agreement has its own system of dispute settlement and no effort has ever been made to establish or even envisage the establishment of a general world trade court, which might receive complaints arising under all forms of trade law disputes. 29 This being the case, are the dispute settlement systems established under RTAs in competition with and possibly even in contradiction to the WTO DSU, are they complementary to the WTO DSU, or do they regulate essentially the same disputes? Can they co-exist or are they cast in eternal opposition? Are they equal or are they inherently subordinate to the WTO DSU? 30 As is illustrated below by the cases reviewed, the questions posed by the co-existence of RTA dispute settlement systems and the WTO DSU arise in a variety of contexts and reflect a range of different legal issues. But the overriding question is whether WTO panels and the Appellate Body have the authority to consider other dispute settlement systems and then act in consequence, or whether they must give precedence to WTO law in all cases.
These questions are part of a broader debate that was opened by the adoption of Article XXIV of the GATT in 1947. Without Article XXIV, preferential agreements violate the fundamental tenets of non-discrimination, which are at the core of the GATT and were carried forward into the WTO in 1994. A decision was made in 1947 to permit the continuation and future formation of customs unions. This was not surprising, given the fact that customs unions were well understood by politicians and economists as a significant form of regional integration 31 and had even played an important role in the emergence of several European states. 32 But the founders of the GATT did not limit themselves to customs unions. Under quiet pressure from the USA and Canada and several other countries, 33 it was decided also to allow the formation of 'free trade areas' (FTAs), a new and undefined form of economic integration, the essence of which involves states reducing trade barriers with one or more countries, but maintaining the freedom to deal directly with third countries. 34 Both forms of trade association were made subject to the conditions that they be notified to the GATT Contracting Parties, that they cover 'substantially all trade' and that they lead to 'trade creation' rather than 'trade diversion'. 35 Article XXIV also created the general obligation of parties to notify their customs unions and FTAs to the GATT Contracting Parties. 36 The substantive and procedural ambiguities of Article XXIV soon became evident:
37 so much so that, for many years, commentators and GATT diplomats considered that the article was essentially political and hortatory in nature. 38 As the GATT customary dispute settlement procedure evolved, many continued to consider that Article XXIV was inherently non-justiciable. 39 However, this did not stop a small number of disputes involving complaints against customs unions or FTAs being taken to GATT panels. 40 Further complexity was added in 1979 when the Contracting Parties to the GATT adopted the 'Enabling Clause', which relaxed the requirements for customs unions and FTAs for developing countries with a view to fostering their more rapid economic development. 41 The increasing numbers of FTAs in the 1980s focused the attention of GATT negotiators engaged in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on the failure of the Contracting Parties or dispute settlement panels to clarify the meaning of the substantive conditions permitting the formation of customs unions and FTAs. Equally troubling was the failure to clarify the procedural requirements inherent in the obligation to notify the Contracting Parties to the GATT of the formation and entry into force of such agreements. Indeed, it appeared at the time that the obligation was being respected more in the breach than in the observance. The result was that among the decisions emerging from the Uruguay Round in 1994 was the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 (1994 Understanding), which contains various interpretative provisions designed to clarify substantive and procedural obligations of WTO Members. 42 The Interpretation also removes one central uncertainty by affirming that disputes under Article XXIV are justiciable and subject to the procedures of the DSU. 43 In the years immediately after 1994, it became clear that the number of RTAs was increasing rapidly. It also became clear that the procedural requirements of Article XXIV and the 1994 Understanding needed careful administration in order to ensure that they were respected. To bring greater discipline to the review of RTAs once notified, the WTO created the standing Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) in 1996. 44 Despite the good intentions of WTO Members, the CRTA did not prove equal to the task of providing a disciplined review process of the many RTAs notified to the WTO in the subsequent years. By 2006, it was clear that the CRTA had failed those who expected that there might be a substantive review of RTAs leading to a principled evaluation of the fidelity of each agreement to the requirements of Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause and the 1994 Understanding. By that point, only one agreement had actually been formally approved, 45 the factual description had been prepared for 19 agreements, 46 but no agreement could be reached on 'systemic' issues. 47 In other words, despite the good intentions of many, WTO Members present in the CRTA could not bring themselves to act as judges of each others' conduct, for fear of being the object of condemnation of their own agreements at a later date. The only way out was to agree to separate the process of judgment upon substantive and procedural issues. To achieve this objective, WTO Members adopted the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements in 2006, which sets out in much greater detail than previous documents the procedural duties of WTO Members to notify the WTO Secretariat of the agreements they plan to negotiate, of the conclusion of the negotiations and of the working of the RTAs. The Secretariat is required to set up a major database of RTAs and is even empowered to make inquiries into the existence of agreements, which have not been notified to the WTO. 49 Adoption of reports is now limited to a one day meeting where the factual report prepared by the Secretariat is studied and questions asked of the parties in the CRTA. 50 No judgment is passed on potential conflict with the law of the WTO. 51 This is now clearly left to complaint procedures under the DSU. The 2006 Transparency Mechanism applied to all RTAs, but, to ensure that preferential agreements made under the Enabling Clause or otherwise by the WTO collective membership were not neglected, the WTO also adopted the Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Agreements in 2010. 52 Publicity requirements for preferential trade agreements are similar but review is before the WTO Committee on Trade and Development.
The result of these developments is that the ball has been sent squarely into the dispute settlement court. The process of review of regional and preferential trade agreements in the WTO now functions, but does not produce reasoned judgments of different agreements, still less does it produce answers to potential disputes between parties. This is deferred entirely to the procedures established under the DSU after a WTO Member has referred a complaint to the DSB. This has advantages and disadvantages. The principal advantage is that the DSU creates a compulsory and a binding procedure, which is open to all WTO Members and can be invoked regardless of economic or political strength. The disadvantage is that it may have placed the attention of dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body too much on the strict terms of the DSU rather than on the broader framework of the totality of WTO law. What follows is a plea to panellists and the Appellate Body to consider the problems posed by the troubled relationship of RTAs and the WTO from the broader perspective of the unity of international trade law rather than forcing all through the prism of the DSU.
To complete this introduction, it is important to remember that this debate on the relationship between dispute settlement procedures of RTAs and the WTO DSU is part of a broader debate on the legitimacy of recourse to bilateral and regional preferential arrangements. Many commentators see these agreements as a threat to the integrity of the WTO, while others see RTAs as a means of promoting trade liberalization as well as experimenting with forms of economic integration not envisaged in WTO law. The literature on the issue is vast; it encompasses analysis by 49 economists, 53 political scientists, 54 and lawyers. 55 The 2011 Report of the WTO ably reviews many aspects of the question. 56 The general consensus is probably best summed up in a report by the World Bank suggesting that trade liberalization is always more efficient for the global economy if it results from multilateral agreement but that, in many circumstances, RTAs may offer an attractive second best solution from the economic and political perspectives. 57 Suffice it to say that these agreements are permitted by the GATT Article XXIV and the law and practice of the WTO and that the great majority of WTO Members have had, and continue to have, recourse to RTAs. For the time being, the WTO has to deal with the problems posed by RTAs and cannot ignore them.
II. THE DISPUTES
A. GATT cases While questions had been raised concerning the legal implications of the GATT Article XXIV process and the possibility of submitting disputes arising out of RTAs to GATT panel reviews in the years following 1947, 58 few GATT Contracting Parties were eager to put these questions to the test. There appeared to be a general reluctance to put such disputes before GATT panels. Thus the 1962-63 'Chicken War', which arose between the USA and the EEC, was fought by retaliation and ultimately solved by negotiation. 59 For over twenty years, GATT diplomats used their skills to keep disputes potentially involving Article XXIV from dispute settlement panels. In the 1976 case arising out of Canada's dissatisfaction at the allegedly inadequate adjustments made by the European Economic Community (EEC) to its tariff, resulting from its enlargement, the panel refused to hear Canada's complaint under GATT Article XXIV.6 on the grounds that the complexity of the issues involved made a panel procedure inappropriate.
60 A similar dispute, mentioned above, between Canada and the EEC on the issue of Canada's ordinary and quality wheat rights dating from the Article XXIV.6 negotiations on 29 By the 1980s, the EEC had granted a range of tariff preferences to different categories of countries under a variety of trade agreements; furthermore, the success of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in encouraging the production of crops in the EC, which subsequently supplanted imports from other GATT Contracting Parties, gave rise to several major disputes in which the EEC sought to defend its legal position, in part, by invoking Article XXIV.
The EEC/EC was the object of several other complaints by the USA and other GATT Contracting Parties. Some involved so-called non-violation complaints in which the EC did not invoke Article XXIV as a defence. But, in others, it did invoke Article XXIV. In the 1985 EEC-Production Aids Granted on Canned Peaches proceeding, the USA alleged that subsidies under the CAP resulted in nullification and impairment of exports to the EEC. 62 The panel issued a non-binding recommendation that the EEC take steps to restore the competitive relationship between EEC produce and the imported goods in question.
In the EC-Citrus litigation, the USA alleged that its exporters of citrus fruits had suffered nullification and impairment of their rights as a result of the grant of preferential tariff treatment of citrus fruit imports by the EU under its trade agreements.
63
The agreements involved 'association' agreements with future EU members such as Spain and Greece, former members of the French Customs Territory, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and Mediterranean partner countries such as Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon. Objection was also taken to the change in tariff treatment of citrus products in the UK, Ireland, and Denmark after their adhesion to the EC in 1973. The USA argued that the tariff preferences constituted violations of GATT Article I, which required compensatory adjustment. The USA also argued that the various agreements did not meet the requirements of Article XXIV in that none appeared to involve a binding commitment to form a customs union or an FTA and further that such agreements being exceptions from Article 1 required a restrictive interpretation. 64 The EC responded that the preferences were contemplated by various paragraphs of Article XXIV as being interim agreements leading to FTAs or customs unions and, in the case of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark, as part of the process of enlargement of the EC itself. The EC also argued that Article XXIV should not be seen as derogating from Article I, but that the two articles constituted 'principles of equal validity' under the GATT. 65 The EC argued that since all these agreements had been notified to the GATT and that since the process of review by working parties established by the Contracting Parties had led to no recommendations either positive or negative, the issue of compatibility with Article XXIV could not be before the panel thus implying that the EC was free to grant these preferences. 66 the EC argued that American citrus exporters could not in fact prove that preferences were the cause of any of the adverse commercial effects that they claimed to have suffered. The USA maintained its point that nothing stopped it from arguing a violation of Article XXIV, but concentrated on adducing evidence that its citrus exports had suffered nullification and impairment under Article I.
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The five panel members appeared to accept that the issue of compatibility with Article XXIV was not before them, partly because of the drafting of the terms of reference, and because there had been no consensus during the process of review of each agreement and no direction had been given to the EC to withdraw its measures; in consequence, the panel considered that there was no issue of prima facie violation of the GATT but only an issue of factual nullification and impairment. Whether the reasoning of the panel in this case was legal or diplomatic, readers must judge for themselves. At the end of a very lengthy and complex report, the panel held that, on the basis of the evidence available to it, the USA had suffered nullification and impairment of its rights in respect of potential exports of fresh oranges and lemons as a result of the EC's granting of preferences under various agreements. The evidence adduced respecting many other categories of citrus fruit and juices was not deemed sufficient to warrant a similar finding. This being the case, the USA was entitled to compensatory adjustment in proportion to the nullification and impairment suffered.
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The Citrus report displayed the reluctance of panels to make firm recommendations on alleged violations of Article XXIV. This reluctance was displayed in several subsequent GATT proceedings. The Citrus report was not adopted.
EEC-Oilseeds was the major non-violation case in which the USA alleged that subsidies to the production of oilseeds by the EEC under the CAP compromised the tariff bindings previously agreed to between the two Contracting Parties under Article II. 69 This case was vigorously argued and the EEC's subsequent implementing action was subject to a second proceeding. 70 The panel held that the result of CAP subsidies had in fact compromised the original expectations of producers in the USA that they would be able to export oilseeds to the EEC market when tariffs had first been bound. The panel thus found that there had been non-violation nullification and impairment resulting from the EEC agricultural subsidies. The complaint of the USA in this case was based on the failure of consultations under Article XXIV.6. However, the EC did not base its defence on Article XXIV but rather suggested that the original commitments had been superseded by other commitments made in later enlargement negotiations. 71 Interestingly, in the case of a dispute between Canada and the EC on the issue of Canada's ordinary and quality wheat rights, which originated in Article XXIV.6 negotiations, Canada based its complaint against the EC on bilateral agreements concluded on 29 March 1962. 72 In response to the argument as to the propriety of raising this bilateral agreement, the Arbitrator agreed to consider it appropriate in the circumstances. 73 The Contracting Parties adopted this report. The EEC-Bananas case was the final, and ultimately unadopted, litigation under the GATT-before the creation of the WTO and the entry into force of the DSUin which Article XXIV issues were argued between the USA, with support of other states, and the EEC. 74 In these cases, the EEC sought to justify its system of import quotas and other measures governing the importation and marketing of bananas from all sources around the world, including both former EU Members' colonies and the major Central American producing countries. The USA argued that the EEC quotas were a violation of Article I, tariff bindings under Article II, as well as Article XI. Among the many arguments advanced by the EEC was the position that the quotas were justified under Article XXIV. In particular, the EEC argued that the Lomé Convention trade and aid agreement with the ACP countries was an FTA justified under article XXIV 75 and that it was also a commodity agreement equally justified under the GATT. 76 The panel rejected both arguments. The panel noted that the Lomé Convention was not a trade agreement based on reciprocity, but rather an essentially unilateral agreement offered by the EU to ACP countries. Hence, it could not be justified under the Article XXIV as a customs union or a FTA. 77 The same position was taken by the panel with respect to the argument that the Bananas Protocol of the Lomé Convention was a commodity agreement. 78 In the opinion of the panel, the protocol did not meet the requirements of the GATT for commodity agreements. 79 72 A 1990 complaint by Canada under Article XXIV.6, but not raising article XXIV issues, was dismissed by an Arbitrator. Award by the Arbitrator, Article XXVIII Rights, above n 61. 73 The Arbitrator noted: 'In principle a claim based on a bilateral agreement cannot be brought under the multilateral dispute settlement procedures of the GATT. An exception is warranted in this case given the close connection of this particular bilateral agreement with the GATT, the fact that the Agreement is consistent with the objectives of the GATT, and that both parties joined in requesting recourse to the GATT Arbitration procedures. ' The significance of this litigation was not easy to establish on the eve of the establishment of the WTO. Most reports, except the EEC-Oilseeds panel reports, had been too controversial to adopt. There was also an obvious reluctance of GATT Contracting Parties to submit the issue of compatibility of particular RTAs, or measures taken pursuant to RTAs to a clear legal test under Article XXIV. The view was widely held that review of customs unions and FTAs was essentially a policy exercise or that the criteria of Article XXIV were too imprecise to apply and that their implementation was best left to negotiation between Contracting Parties. But the fact remains that on several occasions these issues were pleaded and argued before GATT panels, so that the matter was certainly not tabula rasa when it was put to the newly formed WTO. The affirmation of the 1994 Understanding that Article XXIV was subject to dispute settlement rested on solid, but hotly contested ground.
B. WTO cases
Since 1994, the DSU has dealt with at least 13 cases in which the existence of an RTA has been pleaded or argued in one way or another. 80 As the following discussion of these cases demonstrates, arguments have been raised in many different contexts: GATT invocation of GATT Article XX to justify decisions by dispute settlement bodies of RTAs allegedly not in conformity with other provisions of the GATT, 87 arguments of forum non conveniens that the dispute before the DSB in fact involves a dispute under an RTA, 88 as well as the invocation of Article XXIV.6 to challenge the grant of new tariff-rate quotas to a third party resulting from EU enlargement. 89 The invocations of RTAs have been used as both a shield and a sword, 90 in justification and defence. There are some relatively straightforward cases where RTAs were used to argue exemptions from general safeguard measures granted under many FTAs or to halt WTO proceedings in favour of proceedings under an FTA. The most complex and controversial cases are those in which the State Parties to an RTA have sought to plead decisions taken pursuant to their agreements before panels established under the DSU. 91 Most of these decisions have dealt with substantive legal arguments and few have clarified the procedural rights and duties arising under Article XXIV, Article V, or the Enabling Clause. The result is a body of decisions that have clarified some of the relevant law, but which leave many questions unresolved.
The most tantalizing issue emerging from these cases is clearly the matter of the right to plead RTA decisions before the DSB. Does the DSU create a monopoly and give absolute priority to the DSB? Or is it possible to imagine a dialogue between the WTO and RTAs? The Brazil-Retreaded Tyres decision may lead to some clarifications, but many significant issues remain unresolved.
Turkey Textiles
True to its mission to bring greater order to GATT law, the AB took on the challenge posed by RTAs as soon as it was offered. The Turkey-Textiles decision remains the most important single decision rendered by the AB in this area. 92 In this litigation, Turkey argued that it was justified in reintroducing quotas on textile imports from India, despite having bound commitments to India to the contrary, on the grounds that the subsequent establishment of a customs union with the EC provided justification under GATT Article XXIV allowed a plea that the introduction of a customs union might permit the parties to take measures which were normally contrary to the GATT. However, in rejecting Turkey's arguments, the panel held that Article XXIV only justified measures contrary to GATT Article I. 93 The AB took a broader approach in principle and held that Article XXIV contemplated measures covered by a wide range of the GATT beyond the mere scope of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) provisions of Article I. 94 To do this, the AB gave weight to the general provisions of Article XXIV.4 as well as the preamble to paragraph 5 and the requirements of paragraph 8. According to the AB, a party invoking the benefit of Article XXIV had the burden of showing that the contravening measures have been introduced on the formation of the customs union and that it respects the substantive requirements of paragraphs 5 and 8. 95 The AB also stressed the requirement of paragraph 2 of the 1994 Understanding that the measures 'must avoid creating adverse effects upon the commerce of other Members'. 96 Most significantly, the AB read into Article XXIV a condition that to be justified any measure must be 'necessary' for the formation of the customs union. In effect, according to the AB, for the measure to be justified the party invoking it must demonstrate that it meets the tests of paragraphs 5a and 8a of Article XXIV and the party 'must demonstrate that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure'.
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As Trebilcock and Howse note, the approach taken by the AB with respect to the scope of Article XXIV is in principle a broad one, but at the same time the AB imposed a severe burden of justification in the form of the necessity test. 98 Clearly, the Turkey Textiles decision was not designed to open the floodgates. Furthermore, this case deals with a customs union; there has yet to be a fully comparable case dealing with an FTA. formally prohibits safeguards and similar measures between member states, 100 and a surprising number of FTAs, like NAFTA 101 provide for the exclusion of other member states of an FTA from the application of general safeguard measures adopted by any one of them. The first complaint arising out of safeguards involved a plea by Argentina invoking MERCOSUR in justification of a safeguard measure that it had taken. 102 Other cases involved complaints against the USA in circumstances where it had exempted Canada and Mexico from general safeguards measures pursuant to Chapter 8 of NAFTA. 103 Interestingly, the panels in the Argentina-Footwear 104 and the US-Wheat Gluten 105 cases considered arguments based on Article XXIV extensively, while the Appellate Body showed much greater reserve on the same issues. The basis of the safeguards exemption was the same in the US-Line Pipe and the US-Steel Safeguards cases, the Article XXIV justification was argued at some length in the former and briefly in the latter case before the panels, but was given little weight by the AB in either case. 106 In the Argentina-Footwear case, Argentina, after investigating imports and finding injury resulting from imports from all sources, imposed safeguard duties only on imports from non-MERCOSUR countries. The panel concluded that GATT Article XIX and Articles 2 and 4 of the Safeguards Agreement required that the assessment of the sources of injury and the imposition of duties must be done in parallel and, for this reason, found that Argentina had violated its commitments by considering all sources of injury but then excluding its MERCOSUR partners. Argentina argued in further justification of its measures that Article XXIV.8 had the effect of prohibiting the imposition of safeguards against partners in a customs union because Article XIX was not listed among the 'duties and other regulations of commerce' that might be maintained under Article XXIV.8(a)(i) or (b). The panel noted that the footnote to Article 2.1 107 of the Safeguards Agreement did not appear to be an absolute ban on retaining safeguards and, in any case such a restriction might be maintained during the transitional period of establishment of the customs union, or might be accepted under the 'substantially all trade' requirement. 108 The panel also speculated on the possible difference between the treatment of a customs union and an FTA, particularly if the customs union chose to impose safeguards as a single unit. 109 But, in the circumstances, where Argentina had found injury arising out of sources in and outside the MERCOSUR, it could not then apply the safeguard measures only to the external sources and exempt its MERCOSUR partners.
Safeguards and Article XXIV
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The AB took issue with much of the panel's analysis of the application of Article XXIV. In particular, the AB considered that footnote to Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement only applied to safeguard measures applied by a customs union itself, which had not happened in this case. Secondly, the AB stated that any measures to be justified under Article XXIV must be 'introduced upon the formation' of the customs union and were subject to the necessity test declared in the Turkey-Textiles decision.
111 Since these issues had not been properly raised, the AB reversed the panel on these matters. However, the AB strongly affirmed that the parallelism test derived from Article 2 of the Safeguards Agreement was applicable and led the AB, like the panel, to conclude that Argentina had violated the Agreement.
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In the US-Wheat Gluten case, the USITC investigated the complaint that imports of wheat gluten from all sources were causing serious injury in the USA, but subsequently concluded that imports from Mexico and Canada, both NAFTA parties, were not contributing importantly to the serious injury and therefore excluded Canadian and Mexican imports from the application of safeguards measures.
113 This exclusion was challenged by the EC. In response, the USA questioned whether the AB had 'established a broad requirement of 'parallelism' in Argentina-Footwear, but asserted that in following Chapter 8 of NAFTA it had done everything necessary to respect the concept of parallelism set out in that decision. 114 The USA asserted its interpretation of parallelism to require that it consider injury from all sources but allowing it to exempt from safeguard measures NAFTA partners whose exports had not contributed to the injury. 115 The panel found this approach unsupportable under the Safeguards Agreement, which in its view required 'symmetry' of treatment so that all sources be considered or excluded at the start of the investigation. 116 The panel also noted that since the USA interpreted Article XXIV as giving a defence only to Article XIX measures, but not to the Safeguards Agreement, 117 the requirements of symmetry and parallelism must stand and had been violated. 118 The panel further stated: 'We do not believe that we have been asked to rule, and consequently make no ruling, on whether or not, as a general principle, a member of a free trade area can exclude imports from other members of that free trade area from the application of a safeguard measure.'
119 Before the AB, the USA challenged this approach, but the AB, upholding the panel's findings in para 8.182 of the panel report, stated: 'We see no error in this approach, and make no findings on these arguments.'
In the two subsequent cases involving safeguards taken by the USA pursuant to NAFTA, US-Line Pipe and US-Steel Safeguards turn largely on complex arguments pertaining to the application of the principle of parallelism in the particular facts of the investigations, and the methodologies and findings of the customs authorities of the USA. But, in both cases Article XXIV was raised. In the US-Line Pipe case, Korea advanced a procedural argument that the USA could not raise the Article XXIV defence, as the CRTA ' had not yet issued a final decision that NAFTA was in compliance with Article XXIV.8'. 121 The panel rejected this argument out of hand 122 and concluded that ' …the United States is entitled to rely on an Article XXIV defence against Korea's claims under Articles I, XIII and XIX regarding the exclusion of imports from Canada and Mexico from the scope of the line pipe measure'. 123 The AB did not find it necessary to deal with the issue extensively as the panel had found that the conditions for the application of the Article XXIV defence had not been met and therefore declared the findings of the panel on these matters to be moot. 124 Article XXIV is briefly discussed by the panel in the USSteel Safeguards case but dismissed because the panel made a finding that the principle of parallelism had been violated; thus the AB did not have to take up the matter. 125 The result is that there are four decisions in which the method of evaluating justifications for excluding imports from RTA partners from safeguard measures has been challenged by other WTO Members and fairly extensively considered at the panel level. Panels have assumed that exclusion from safeguards is legitimate if the principle of parallelism is followed, but there is no ruling by the AB that the advantage given to FTA partners 126 
Exemption from customs duties
When the NAFTA negotiations were completed, Canada maintained a system of exemptions from customs duties on automobiles directed to companies, which were both importers and producers of automobiles in Canada. This had the effect of imposing duties on some, mainly Japanese, automobiles, while exempting those of companies with production facilities in Canada. Japan objected to the measures and complained to the DSB. 127 This was part of an allegedly non-discriminatory scheme, originating in the 1965 Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement ('Autopact'), 128 by which all manufacturers of automobiles who maintained a certain level of Canadian value added were exempted from duties both across NAFTA borders, but also into Canada from third countries. Canada's defence was that the measures were non-discriminatory, but it also raised Article XXIV as a defence to the Japanese critique. 129 The EC, as intervener, responded that the measures failed to meet the test of necessity and there was not even a true FTA since the Autopact, as carried forward into NAFTA Annex 300A, was really a sectoral agreement. 130 The panel summarily dismissed the Article XXIV argument on the ground that it did not contemplate the granting of preferences to third states. 131 In a 2006 complaint, that has not gone beyond the consultations stage, Argentina complained that the EU by increasing China's tariff-rate quota by 20,500 tonnes to import garlic, acting pursuant to Article XXIV, as a result of its most recent expansion, had failed to respect the conditions set by XXIV.6 by not taking into account Argentina's 'initial negotiating rights'. 
Status of measures under the enabling clause
Until the proceedings in India's complaint against the EU concerning treatment of certain intellectual property rights under the EU's implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), there had been no interpretation of the scope and application of the Enabling Clause, adopted as part of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Agreements in 1979, as it applied to other measures taken by WTO Members. The EU not only implemented preferences under the GSP but also added additional categories of preferences: in particular, the EU offered preferential treatment to 12 states that agreed to implement special measures to combat production and trafficking in drugs, the 'Drug Arrangements'. India, not being one of the 12, complained that the EU had violated GATT Article I and that the measures were not justified under the Enabling Clause-the legal basis for the GSP and part of the WTO acquis. 133 The panel held that India had shown that the measures violated Article I and that the EU had failed to show that the Drug Arrangements were justified under the Enabling Clause or under Article XX(b). 134 The AB agreed with the panel that the Enabling Clause constituted an exception from Article I, 135 but held that it was incumbent on India to raise the violation of the Enabling Clause and for the EU to make the case that the conditions of the Enabling Clause had been respected. This the EU had failed to do, as the AB held that the principle of non-discrimination in the Enabling Clause did not necessarily mean exactly the same treatment of all Generalized System of Preferences beneficiaries but, as a minimum, did require the same treatment of all 'similarly situated' beneficiaries. 136 The Enabling Clause is thus shown to operate in a manner similar to Article XXIV or Article XX with respect to the collective right to development of least developed countries. It sets conditions, which must be respected if it is to be invoked to justify tariff treatment that deviates from that required by GATT Article I.
Invocation of RTA disputes before the WTO dispute settlement procedures
Perhaps the most important WTO decisions for the purposes of this article deal with the arguments made by WTO Members in various cases that the WTO DSB is not the appropriate forum to hear the case or that the DSB should take note of and give effect to decisions taken under the aegis of dispute settlement provisions of various RTAs. 137 These cases most starkly demonstrate the potential consequences of the same states being parties to multiple trade treaties with different dispute settlement procedures. This is particularly acute in the many situations when the provisions of the WTO and the RTA are identical, 138 are based on the same principles 139 or when it is affirmed that the RTA should be interpreted in accordance with WTO law. 140 The nature of the WTO as the basic matrix of international trade law becomes very clear in these cases as does the issue of whether this implies that the WTO DSB has primacy over any RTA dispute settlement procedure or whether the DSB is precluded from considering the very existence, let alone the results, of any such procedure. The first case to raise these issues is Argentina-Poultry 141 in which Argentina sought to prevent Brazil from proceeding with a complaint against Argentina's antidumping measures, on the ground that Brazil had already pursued its recourses under the MERCOSUR Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies ('Protocol of Brasilia') and had obtained a judgment. Argentina argued as a preliminary issue that Brazil should not be allowed to bring the case before the DSB because it had not respected the principle of good faith and was therefore estopped from proceeding. 142 According to Argentina, for Brazil to have pursued the procedure under the Protocol of Brasilia and then, when dissatisfied with the outcome, to seek to pursue the same case under the DSU was evidence of bad faith, a general principle of international law which should prevent Brazil from proceeding. 143 Alternatively, under Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must take into account all treaty obligations existing between the parties, in particular another trade agreement dealing with the same issues.
144 Brazil responded that the requisite legal and factual elements of the plea of estoppel were not present and that the Protocol of Brasilia (unlike the signed but not yet in force Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes or 'Olivos Protocol') contained no express 'fork in the road' provision. Furthermore, Brazil denied abusing its rights and asserted that it was simply exercising its rights under the DSU. 145 Chile, the EU, and the USA made various arguments in support of Argentina.
146 Only Paraguay, a MERCOSUR partner, called for the full recognition of the existence of the RTA.
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The panel found for Brazil on the grounds that to violate the principle of good faith there must be violation of an explicit provision of WTO law and 'more than mere violation'.
148 Similarly, the panel found no room for the plea of estoppel, laying considerable emphasis on the fact the Olivos Protocol was much more explicit than the Protocol of Brasilia and was not yet in force between the parties. 149 The panel also held that Argentina was not calling on it to interpret the MERCOSUR ruling in a particular way but actually to apply that ruling as a matter of WTO law-something which the panel considered it was not permitted to do.
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The second case in this series involved the attempt by the Government of Canada to place evidence before a WTO panel hearing in support of its complaint against the conduct of anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures in the USA. The evidence consisted in the decisions of various Canada-United States bi-national panels under Chapter 19 of NAFTA dealing with essentially the same issues. Canada sought to use these decisions as evidence that its claims against the USA in the WTO proceeding were well founded. The panel declined to rule on the weight to be given to the decisions but agreed to include them in a footnote of its decision. 151 In the footnote, the Panel noted that references to these decisions were 'inappropriate' because: (i) the proceeding in the NAFTA fell outside the terms of reference of the WTO DSU Article 21.5 Panel since 'a determination or decision in a NAFTA proceeding is not a measure taken to comply' with a DSB ruling, (ii) the panel's decision in the NAFTA proceedings were the subject of a pending review, and (iii) that Canada had failed to point out that the Commission was 'erroneously precluded by the NAFTA panel from reopening the record and that, accordingly, the Section 129 Determination is based on a different record than that in the NAFTA proceedings'. 152 The AB, since it decided the case on other grounds, did not consider the decisions at all.
The Mexico-Soft Drinks decision, 153 like the Argentina-Poultry, represented a determined attempt by Mexico to resist having to respond before the DSB to a complaint by the USA against allegedly discriminatory taxes on imported high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) and products containing HFCS. Mexico considered that it had acted in the context of a dispute with the USA resulting from the failure of the USA to give effect to an agreement to allow the importation of Mexican sugar after the conclusion of NAFTA in 1994. Considering that the dispute was properly to be conducted under NAFTA, Mexico made a plea of forum non conveniens before the DSB, in answer to the complaint of the USA, noting that its efforts to institute a dispute settlement panel under NAFTA Chapter 20 had been frustrated by the USA.
Mexico advanced three central arguments. First, that it had an agreement with the United States-NAFTA, which was allowed by WTO law, and that NAFTA included a dispute settlement procedure under Chapter 20, which it sought to use. 154 Due to the refusal of the USA to refer the dispute to NAFTA Chapter 20, the measures which Mexico had adopted were proportional and necessary under GATT Article XX(d) in order to ensure respect for Mexican laws and regulations and to encourage the USA to respect NAFTA. This being the case Mexico asked that the panel refrain from ruling on the case. Mexico also asked that the panel recommend that the parties take up their dispute under NAFTA Chapter 20. 155 The USA focused foremost on the argument that the taxes in question were discriminatory and thus manifestly violated GATT Article III. Beyond this, the USA argued that Mexico's plea of forum non conveniens was beyond the mandate of the panel and that the taxes could not be justified as necessary to ensure respect for Mexico's laws and regulations. 156 Fundamentally, the USA argued that the only issues before the panel were Mexico's obligations under WTO law and that the request to refuse to make findings and refer the parties to NAFTA was quite outside the bounds of the panel's legal authority under the DSU and the Memorandum between the parties. 157 The USA distinguished Argentina-Poultry as being a totally different and distinct case. 158 The EU, as intervener, indicated that in principle it is 'not excluded that other treaties form part of public international law, relevant to a case…'.
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The panel report deals extensively with Mexico's arguments, but the panel was clearly more impressed by the assertions of the USA that the Mexican measures dealt with similar products and taxed a similar product (HFCS) in a discriminatory manner in violation of Article III. In response to Mexico's position that its measures were necessary to ensure respect for its laws and regulations under Article XX(d) and that the panel had discretion to refuse to rule and to refer the parties to their NAFTA obligations, the panel displayed great scepticism. The panel would not accept the characterization of 'laws and regulations' as referring to international obligations. 160 The panel held that it had no discretion under Article XXIII, the DSU, or the standard terms of reference of the dispute to refuse to make findings. 161 On the contrary, the panel found that there existed a 'separate' dispute between the parties under NAFTA over which it had no right to rule. The AB was in fundamental agreement with the panel 162 holding that a panel under the DSU, while it had certain inherent jurisdiction over procedure and the right to determine its jurisdiction, certainly did not enjoy the kind of broad discretion to refuse to hear a case as claimed by Mexico. 163 Indeed, the AB seems to have held that for a panel to refuse to hear a case would be tantamount to denying a WTO Member's right to having a dispute heard under the 164 One of the interesting features of this case is the manner in which a dispute originating in the exercise of exceptional rights under an RTA, allegedly permitted by Article XXIV which allows preferential arrangements, was largely adjudicated under Article XX(d), which allows exceptions from the basic provisions of the GATT. Whether there is any link between these exceptions and in particular the 'necessity' analysis under both articles will be dealt with below.
The major case dealing with Article XXIV is the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres case.
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This is a remarkable case from a number of perspectives, not the least because the measures defended by Brazil were adopted for purposes of environmental protection, but also because Brazil pleaded the necessity of giving effect to MERCOSUR customs union rules as determined by a MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal. 166 For reasons of public health and environmental protection, Brazil had, in 2000, adopted rules banning the importation of retreaded and used automobile and truck tyres from all sources. As a result of a legal challenge by Uruguay that the ban violated the MER-COSUR guarantees of free access of products from other partners, Brazil adopted a revised rule in 2004 exempting retreaded tyres from MERCOSUR countries from the general ban. The EC challenged this measure (i) as violating Article XI and not being justified under Article XX and also (ii) as violating Articles I.1 and XIII.1 and not being justified under Article XXIV.5. The panel concluded that the ban could indeed reduce the number of waste tyres in Brazil and hence contribute to protecting public health and the environment. 167 The AB agreed that a WTO Member had the right to set its own environmental objectives and also the level of protection desired. 168 In answer to the EC objections to the panel's approach, the AB ruled that the appropriate test was that the measure challenged should ' …bring(s) about a material contribution to the achievement of its objective'. 169 In the circumstances, the 164 Ibid, at paras 53, 54, and 56. The AB first notes that '[a] decision by a panel to decline to exercise validly established jurisdiction would seem to "diminish" the right of a complaining Member to "seek the redress of a violation of obligations" within the meaning of Article 23 of the DSU, and to bring a dispute pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU. This would not be consistent with a panel's obligations under Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU'. However, the AB goes on to note that they would 'express no view as to whether there may be other circumstances in which legal impediments could exist that would preclude a panel from ruling on the merits of the claims that are before it'. The Appellate Body's decision is carefully tailored to the circumstances before it, and does not preclude a finding of a legal impediment in other situations. However, it remains unclear whether the legal impediment could take the form of an RTA. Further on, the AB remarks that Mexico's argument 'would entail a determination of whether the United States has acted consistently or inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations' and concludes that it saw 'no basis in the DSU for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes'. Moreover, 'accepting Mexico's interpretation would imply that the WTO dispute settlement system could be used to determine rights and obligations outside the covered agreements'. 165 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, above n 80 and completed by WTO Arbitration under AB concluded that the import ban met Brazil's objectives 170 and that the panel, after weighing all the alternatives, had not erred in finding that the ban was 'necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health'.
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The AB parted company and reversed the panel's analysis of the application of the chapeau to Article XX. Whereas the panel had found that compliance with a MERCOSUR arbitral decision to be a rational basis for the ban and the resulting discrimination between MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR states, the AB held that there had to be a clear link between the discrimination and the objective pursued.
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In this case, the AB found that the environmental objective was not the reason given for the ban and compliance with an arbitral decision bore no rational link with the true objective pursued. According to the AB, discrimination based on an unrelated objective was arbitrary and could not meet the test of the chapeau to Article XX. Brazil could have raised the environmental justification and arguably might have succeeded, but it was not for the AB to second-guess its reasons for not doing so. 173 Similarly, the AB concluded that for the same reasons the ban constituted a 'disguised restraint on international trade'.
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The AB in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres does several very interesting things. From the environmental perspective, it comes as close as any WTO case to recognizing the necessity of environmental measures and their consequent impact on international trade. Similarly, both the panel and the AB, while certainly not ruling on MERCO-SUR issues, go a considerable way in analysing the consequences of decisions taken pursuant to an RTA. The RTA ceases to be something that dares not speak its name. The panel even goes so far as to suggest that an RTA may in appropriate cases be part of public international law, which may be relevant to the decision on a complaint under the DSU. 175 The AB did not deem it appropriate to respond to various arguments of the EU and of some interveners that it should not consider MERCO-SUR as it had not been approved by the CRTA, or Brazil's position that RTAs 170 Ibid, at para 155. 171 Ibid, at para 183. The AB also agreed that the panel had made an objective analysis of the facts as required by the DSU Article 11 (para 209). See generally paras 210-212. 172 Ibid, at para 227. 173 Ibid, at para 234. In fn 445 to the same paragraph the AB notes: 'In addition, we note that Article XXIV.8(a) of the GATT 1994 exempts, where necessary, measures permitted under Article XX from the obligation to eliminate "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce" with respect to "substantially all the trade" within a customs union. Therefore, if we assume, for the sake of argument, that MERCOSUR is consistent with Article XXIV and that the Import Ban meets the requirements of Article XX, this measure, where necessary, could be exempted by virtue of Article XXIV.8(a) from the obligation to eliminate other restrictive regulations of commerce within a customs union.' 174 Ibid, at para 239. 175 Panel Report, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, above n 167, para 7.283. The Panel notes that 'in observing that the MERCOSUR ruling provided a reasonable basis for Brazil to enact an exemption from the import ban in favour of remolded tyres originating MERCOSUR, we are not suggesting that the invocation of any international agreement would be sufficient under any circumstances, in order to justify the existence of discrimination in the application of a measure under the chapeau of Article XX. Rather, we have considered the specific circumstances of the case, including the nature of the international agreement and of the ruling on the basis of which Brazil has acted, and concluded that in the circumstances, this provided a reasonable basis for Brazil to enact an exemption from the import ban in favour of its MER-COSUR partners'.
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http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from enjoyed a prima facie presumption of compliance with Article XXIV 176 or that MER-COSUR was subject to different rules as it had been negotiated under the Enabling Clause. 177 As in the case of Mexico-Soft Drinks, the link between the possible justifications of exceptional measures under an RTA in violation of other provisions of the GATT is argued as much in function of Article XX as under Article XXIV.
After a lengthy process under its safeguards legislation in 2010, the Dominican Republic imposed safeguard duties of 38% on polypropylene bags and tubular fabric, with partial exemption for Columbia, Indonesia, Mexico, and Panama. Several South and Central American WTO Members complained to the DSB that these duties violated GATT Articles I, II, XIX as well as the Agreement on Safeguards. The Dominican Republic responded that it bound GATT customs duties on the items in questions and alleged that the dispute in fact had nothing to do with its obligations under WTO law but represented a dispute with certain countries concerning rights and obligations under two RTAs, the Central America-Dominican Republic FTA and the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA. 178 On this basis, the Dominican Republic requested that the panel issue a preliminary ruling staying the proceedings on the ground that they were an abuse of the WTO DSU process. 179 The complainants denied that they had ever raised other agreements and asserted that they enjoyed complete freedom to assert their WTO rights before the DSB. 180 The USA, the EU, and Turkey supported them in this view as third parties. In response to questions from the panel, all parties, including the Dominican Republic, expressed the view that:
There were no limitations under the covered agreements for a Member to impugn a measure through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism if it considered that that measure, as well as being inconsistent with commitments incurred by another Member under an FTA, was inconsistent with obligations under the covered agreements. 181 This being the case the panel felt that 'no additional comment' on the matter was needed.
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US-Tuna II (Mexico) (also known as Tuna Dolphin II) demonstrates the tension between RTA dispute settlement and the WTO's DSB. In this case, Mexico requested consultations on a series of measures passed by the USA addressing the labelling of tuna as 'dolphin-safe'. 183 Mexico argued that these measures were 184 The USA requested that the dispute be moved to NAFTA, invoking the NAFTA choice of forum provision under Article 2005(4). 185 When Mexico failed to move the proceedings, the USA announced that it had requested NAFTA dispute settlement consultations with Mexico on its failure to move the 'dolphin-safe' labelling complaint from the WTO to NAFTA. 186 The USA also made a statement in front of the DSB on Mexico's panel request where the USA underlined that it was 'very concerned' that Mexico was proceeding with the request despite the fact that the USA had invoked the choice of forum provision. 187 Mexico argued that the provisions cited by the USA did not apply to the dispute and that the dispute had 'important multilateral implications that had to be resolved in the WTO'. 188 In the end, however, the NAFTA issue was not argued by the USA in front of the Panel and was not raised in the Panel or Appellate Body reports.
In conclusion, this somewhat lengthy review of the cases dealing with Article XXIV shows that, sixty-five years after the adoption of the GATT and sixteen years after the creation of the WTO, and despite the existence of literally hundreds of RTAs, the law governing their relationship with the WTO remains a matter of considerable uncertainty. The DSB will give effect to certain provisions of RTAs such as the exemption for safeguards as long as the parallelism principle is respected. The exact reading of the exemption for 'laws and regulations' is far from clear, as is the relationship between Articles XXIV and XX. Whether dispute settlement proceedings under RTAs can be invoked before the DSB is also a matter of debate. On one hand, there seems to be a claim to a virtual monopoly by the AB and yet there does appear to be some limited openness to dealing with the consequences of RTA dispute settlement decisions. Context may be the key.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ACCOUNTING FOR RTAs AT THE WTO
A. Arguments for accounting for RTAs at the WTO Many different explanations have been given in various cases by panels, the AB, parties, and interveners for the difficulties faced by WTO panels and the AB in taking into account RTAs or proceedings under RTAs as they hear cases under WTO law. On the other hand, it is possible to advance arguments in favour of a more open policy towards RTAs and especially the dispute settlement provisions of RTAs. This part of the article is devoted to an appraisal of the arguments that can be made on both sides of the ledger.
RTAs are not WTO law
The most common explanation of why it is not possible to take RTAs into account in WTO proceedings is that an RTA is not part of the WTO legal acquis. This being the case, so the argument runs, the provisions of an RTA or decisions taken under RTA dispute settlement proceedings do not form part of the law relevant to reaching a decision under the DSU. 189 The assumption is that WTO law is defined and exhaustively set out in the Final Act of the Marrakesh Agreement, and that the GATT 1994, the Agreement Constituting the WTO, the covered agreements, understandings and declarations constitute the complete and definitive statement of WTO law. 190 This is surely based on an impoverished vision of law itself. It is based on a highly positivist view of law embracing both procedural and substantive matters and implying that law can exist in a vacuum and can be limited to a particular set of texts. This is an extreme view of law and is, in fact, not one which the AB has fully espoused since a number of decisions indicate that WTO law must be more broadly cast to include fundamental procedural norms as well as general principles of public international law. 191 Thus, it seems anomalous that the DSB should be refusing to draw upon other treaties made by WTO Members while at the same time being willing to draw upon other general elements of public international law.
However, as a working hypothesis in a world where WTO Members are highly jealous of their prerogatives as 'masters of the treaty ', 192 where states are concerned not to expand the reach of the very specific commercial commitments that they have made to each other and where they do not wish to see the emergence of any kind of international economic government or the expansion of the powers of the WTO as an international organization, this approach is understandable. One can see why panels and the AB have adopted this position on a number of occasions when they have been asked to consider an RTA or decisions taken pursuant to an RTA as relevant to deciding a case. But, a working hypothesis can hardly be erected into a principle of law. There must be more weighty reasons at work. Furthermore, Joost Pauwelyn has provided a very convincing distinction between adding to WTO obligations to all 189 Another issue to consider, although not addressed further in this article, is whether arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU would allow parties to mandate panels to take into account RTA rules and decisions. Marceau and Tomazos suggest that arbitration under this provision would still be WTO arbitration and thus subject to the exclusivity provision of Members, something which is prohibited, and applying RTAs to the parties in the context of a WTO dispute in a way which binds them alone and in no way increases general WTO commitments. 193 If this approach were to be adopted, RTA parties would be held to their RTA obligations without affecting the general rights and duties of WTO Members.
RTAs are not a part of the mandate of a panel under the DSU
A number of parties and interveners and the AB itself have stated that panels must strictly adhere to the standard terms of reference governing the case in the sense that the terms of reference alone empower the panel and the AB to hear and decide the case. This is a much more weighty argument which sounds both in procedure and in substance. The terms of reference agreed by the DSB do define the limits of a case, just as the agreement to arbitrate defines the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. Article 7 of the DSU authorizes the panel:
1. …To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document…and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s). 2. Panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.
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These terms of reference as described in Article 7 do lend themselves to the suggestion that the panel should confine its attention to the covered agreements and to the dispute between the parties, but are they exhaustive? 195 Are the bounds of the dispute set by WTO law as narrowly defined as this or can they be expanded or limited by the DSB and the parties? Is there an element of discretion that can be exercised by both or is it restricted by the wording of believes that an RTA is relevant to their dispute? If by the DSB or WTO law in general, then it must be noted that the basic principles of the GATT are not mentioned in the terms of reference, but this does not stop the parties alleging violations of the GATT in virtually every case. If one party alleges a violation of GATT Article I, the allegation must be substantiated, but after that, the burden shifts to the other party, which cannot simply refuse to debate a particular GATT article as being irrelevant to the case. The same is true of the broader WTO legal acquis. If this is correct, the parties and the DSB can define the parameters of the dispute at the outset and this can preclude raising arguments not made in the initial complaint, but the terms of reference cannot stop a party from advancing an argument based on its vision of WTO law. A further objection to placing emphasis on the mandate is that it begs the question of what law governs the interpretation of the covered agreement in question or of the GATT itself. A liberal interpretation of the content of WTO law greatly increases the scope of the mandate given by the DSB in a given case. A further objection to limiting the relevant agreements to the mandate is that rules of treaty interpretation and general principles of public international law are also applicable in the dispute resolution process. A narrow reading of article 7 of the DSU would not reflect the fact that the AB has already reached outside the four corners of the treaty text. A further question raised by the argument that the mandate, as set out in the specific terms of reference of a case, defines the ambit of the law applicable to a dispute is whether the DSB might not declare an RTA relevant to a dispute in setting the terms of reference. What if this happened? By this logic, the panel would be bound to consider arguments based on the RTA. On the other hand, continued refusal by the DSB to give such a mandate when requested by one party would almost certainly have a profound influence upon the manner in which the panel approaches the dispute and, in all likelihood, panels will see this as a direction not to consider the RTA.
The impact of the DSU Article 11 and 19
Related to the issue of the mandate of panels and the law that they are authorized to apply is the interpretation of articles 11 and 19. Article 11 refers to the 'matter' before the panel and also to 'rulings provided for in the covered agreements'. Similarly, Article 19 makes panel and AB recommendations dependent on the conclusion 'that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement'. These two provisions can be interpreted as requiring a panel to confine itself to applying WTO law as defined by the covered agreements. This interpretation is certainly possible, but is it the only plausible approach? For the reasons set out above, this approach does not appear to be entirely convincing. Even if one accepts the premise that the matter referred to in Article 11 requires a claim grounded in a covered agreement, this does not necessarily mean that an RTA cannot furnish a valid defence to the claim. Beyond this lies the broader question of the definition of WTO law and the suggestion that the net has been cast too narrowly up to now.
4. The DSB is precluded from denying a request to establish a panel It has been held that a decision by the DSB or a panel that a dispute should be referred to procedures under an RTA, rather than being argued under the DSU, would be tantamount to denying the right of a WTO Member to having its case heard by the WTO. 196 There are two central aspects to this claim: (i) that no request to form a panel can be denied and (ii) that a panel could not decide that a case before it should be heard before another body.
Perhaps the most persuasive basis for this position is not the legal but the policy justification. If the WTO is to serve as the fundamental and irreducible minimum of international trade law between states it must provide the central means of settling disputes. If it is really compulsory and binding, there can be no opting out of the DSU, no reservations are allowed and all states, great or small, must be able to rely on their right of access to the DSB. As a matter of policy this is a tempting argument, especially if one takes the view that RTAs run the grave risk of weakening the very structure of the WTO and WTO law.
197 By this token, RTAs are permitted but must not be allowed to swamp the WTO as an institution and as a mode of settling trade disputes. At a time when over 393 RTAs have been notified to the WTO under Article XXIV or the Enabling Clause, where the pace of negotiation of new and even larger agreements remains frenetic 198 and where the conclusion of the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations remains a remote possibility, this approach serves to maintain the essential integrity of the WTO as an institution and as reflecting an essential body of trade rules not to be diluted by others.
If the policy arguments in support of this position are strong, the legal underpinnings are less convincing. In the first instance, this position does not deal with the legal implications of the fact that many states have made treaties, before or subsequent to adhering to the WTO, which give priority to dispute settlement procedures under FTAs. 199 In some circumstances, the earlier in time general treaty may forbid the conclusion of later, more specific treaties. 200 However, in the case of the WTO, Article XXIV expressly allows the conclusion of later more specific treaties between some WTO Members. At the very least, this argument fails to deal with the problem of co-existence of conflicting treaty commitments. If states have decided to give themselves the option of choosing FTA procedures, why should the WTO frustrate this choice? Secondly, is referral of parties to the procedure that they have specifically chosen a failure to deal with the dispute? Surely not. Domestic and international courts do this all the time. Lex specialis is frequently given preference over lex generalis by international tribunals and this is done to give effect to the will of the parties to the more specific treaty. 201 Thirdly, the denial of the legitimacy of the choice of a non-WTO procedure suggests a narrow reading of Article XXIV, which would then allow states only a partial authority to enter into RTAs. To insist that a state always has a right to a WTO panel is to assert the primacy of the WTO in a powerful way, which negates other treaty commitments and reads down the very language of the GATT Article XXIV.
5. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is unhelpful 202 To invoke this maxim in order to deny the recourse sought by a party to a dispute is to replace analysis by nomenclature. There is either a legal right existing under an RTA, which is recognized by the WTO, or there is not. Asserting a legal maxim does little to solve the underlying tension of how to reconcile divergent obligations between RTAs and the WTO. As Marceau notes, the WTO will always be the convenient forum for WTO-law breaches, while an RTA dispute body will always be the convenient forum for a breach of that agreement. 203 Furthermore, to assert that there may be a right but there is no remedy recognized by the WTO is to return to a vision of law which has been rejected in most legal systems and which is certainly not consistent with modern public international law. 204 Contemporary international law places great stress on the principle of effectiveness and rejects the suggestion that no solution can be found. 205 6. WTO law as supreme law Does the position adopted by the AB in various cases reflect a claim of supremacy of WTO law over all other treaties governing the economic relations of states?
206 This suggestion is appealing at first blush. The WTO was conceived as providing a minimum level of rights and duties, which should bind all WTO Members. 207 There is an unarticulated, but nonetheless significant, aspiration to universality, which is slowly being realized as the last major economies of the world join the WTO. 208 The provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and various covered agreements and the GATT before them are designed to set basic standards to be respected by all WTO Member. They are generally described as forming a floor not a ceiling constituting a level below which states are not permitted to descend. 209 There is a certain logic to the idea that the dispute settlement arrangement applicable to them all and designed to resolve all disputes between them should exclude recourse to any other form of settlement.
But is WTO law in general and the DSU in particular designed to be supreme over all other trade treaties? This is questionable. First, there is no statement of supremacy or exclusivity such as that which exists in Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 210 Nor is there any statement that the DSB must be the exclusive body to hear trade disputes between WTO Members. The DSU Article 23 can be interpreted as requiring all disputes under covered agreements to go before the DSB, but it surely does not preclude the creation of dispute settlement procedures under RTAs. There may be a limited claim to procedural supremacy to hear disputes under covered agreements, but there is no claim to substantive supremacy. Supremacy of WTO law would have to be read into the DSU. Second, to be supreme in law there has to be a desire on the part of the makers of the treaty to be subject to a supreme treaty or international organization. Yet, the WTO is not even a formal Specialized Agency of the UN, still less an acknowledged institution of global economic government. The only real obligation of WTO Members is to obey WTO law. The WTO is not a supranational institution and WTO law is not directly effective in the legal systems of member states. Where do the hypothetical supremacy and the alleged exclusivity of the DSU come from? It is droit prétorien of the purest form. Yet, the AB and even more panels have been careful not to take an 'activist' stance with respect to WTO law and have been careful to base their reading of the law squarely on the text and the letter rather than on its spirit and purpose. 211 It is generally asserted that this conservative approach is well suited to a legal system based on careful and limited consent to very specific commitments, which are reached only after careful negotiations. 212 It is quite clear that the WTO is not a supranational body; it is a 'member-driven' organization whose decisions are reached by consensus. If the WTO is supreme this principle should be enunciated in the texts and not read in by the AB.
If one must reject the idea of supremacy of WTO law in general is there still an argument for the supremacy of the DSU? Again, it is hard to find an explicit statement of supremacy or even of a will to exclude other remedies, unless one focuses on the wording of the terms of reference of a particular dispute. The insufficiency of this approach has been discussed above. It is hardly convincing.
A further interesting line of questioning relates to the status of the DSB. Should it be seen as the supreme arbiter of international trade law? However appealing this suggestion may be to WTO supporters, there is no foundation for the argument in WTO law. Suggestions have been made that there should be a supreme arbitral tribunal for investor-state and other forms of international commercial arbitration, but all attempts to attain this objective in the field of arbitration have failed. 213 The International Chamber of Commerce Research Foundation has recently released a report supporting the WTO in general and calling for the creation of a global trade tribunal in particular. 214 However appealing this may be, the idea of a global trade tribunal has yet to find support among WTO Members. 7. RTA law may be violated, but not WTO law In the Argentina-Poultry case, it was argued that if any rule was violated by refusal to take a decision of a MERCOSUR tribunal into account before the DSB, it was that of MERCOSUR and not the DSB. By this logic, WTO Members who consider that their rights under an RTA are denied by a proceeding before the DSU should look to their remedies under the RTA in question: these states should not look to a WTO panel to resolve the differences which they have with an RTA partner. This position begs the question, raised above, as to whether it is proper for a WTO panel to act as though it must be blind to a claim or a defence based on the law governing two WTO Members under an RTA. This position leads to the same difficulties as those encountered by states, which wish the WTO to be sensitive to treaties enshrining other values like labour, environmental, or human rights standards. Is it any more justified to draw a sharp distinction between pure trade and environmental standards as between a WTO dispute and a dispute under another trade treaty? Many states and commentators have been insisting that the WTO should accommodate other values into trade law. 215 Can the same argument not be made, even more strongly, for the mutual accommodation of the DSU and dispute settlement proceedings in trade disputes under RTAs? Interpretation of disputes based on mutual accommodation between potentially conflicting or overlapping international commitments is surely vital for the maintenance of the international legal order as long as there is no global legislator with authority to resolve such conflicts.
8. All WTO Members have agreed to the DSU, but not to every RTA Another reason given for the refusal to give effect to RTA dispute settlement commitments and decisions in proceedings under the DSU is that particular RTAs only bind a few WTO Members and thus cannot be used to commit all the others. This appears to fit the logic of the WTO as involving specific commitments between states and not requiring any obligations beyond those formally contracted by each one. At first blush, this argument appears to be based on the universally accepted principle that states can only be bound by treaties they have agreed to accept. But, on further analysis, this argument is not well founded. Indeed, this is a curious position to be adopted by parties to the most significant MFN commitment in history, GATT Article I.1, which grants WTO Members whatever rights any other Member has granted to another state without any requirement of formal offer or acceptance. To suggest that a panel cannot give effect to an RTA because all WTO Members are not party to it is to deny the very legitimacy of the RTA. It suggests that no legal relationship can be recognized under international law unless each state has entered into it. Yet, international law is made up of a myriad of interrelated treaty commitments, which have to co-exist even when they are not all mutually compatible. To refuse to recognize the legal effect of commitments made by other states is in a sense to question the legitimacy of these commitments, despite the fact that WTO Members have agreed to the possibility of creating customs unions and RTAs by virtue of Article XXIV of the GATT. But, even without Article XXIV, is it not the practice of states to recognize the effects of legal relationships, which are created by others unless these relationships violate international law or unless they contradict their own international commitments? Furthermore, this is not an instance of states being forced to accept obligations to which they did not subscribe. Only parties to an RTA can invoke its terms and only other parties can be called upon to accept the consequences of having made their commitment. If a panel were to recognize the effect of a decision under an RTA or if the panel were to refer the parties to the dispute settlement provisions under their agreement, the panel would not be binding on other WTO Members in any way. WTO cases only bind immediate parties and a dispute under the DSU only involves the parties to it or those who voluntarily choose to intervene.
No State may avoid the force of WTO law
It has been asserted that states cannot invoke an RTA before a WTO proceeding, in mitigation of WTO obligations, because it is impossible for them to avoid the force of WTO law. This assertion has been made in association with the assertion that WTO Members cannot be deprived of their right to obtain the constitution of a panel by the DSB. 216 As suggested above, this is based on circular reasoning and does not answer the question as to the content of WTO law. It constitutes a denial of the legitimacy or an assertion of the incompleteness of commitments under an RTA by WTO Members. The effect of such reasoning is to allow a state to make a commitment in one treaty, which can be negated by proceedings before the DSB, as happened between Canada and the USA in the Canada-Periodicals case. 217 But, is it really the object of the WTO to undermine commitments validly made by two or more Members? If states are allowed to join the WTO on the basis of temporarily diminished obligations, are these provisions of accession agreements to be deemed invalid? Unless it is a violation of WTO law for two states to agree between themselves to hold each other to a different or lesser standard than that required by the WTO, by granting exceptions to what would normally be the WTO rule, 218 it is submitted that the refusal by WTO panels to give effect to RTAs weakens the very fabric of international law, and should not be seen as an affirmation of the rule of law under the WTO.
No reservations from WTO law are permitted
Another reason given for why it is difficult, if not impossible, to plead an RTA before the DSB is that the WTO in general and the DSU in particular brooks no reservations. Agreement Constituting the WTO and declarations or interpretative notes may specify how a provision is to be interpreted; in which case a particular interpretation is mandated. This being the case, so the explanation runs, panels and the AB have no capacity to give effect to choices made by WTO Members in the context of FTAs, should these regional agreements not conform to the clear requirements of WTO law. This explanation may be well founded if RTAs are understood to involve restrictions upon or deviations from WTO law. However, if one takes the view that Article XXIV permits RTAs, provided they meet the conditions of that article, it is difficult to believe that they should be considered to be illegitimate. This is all the more arguable in the many cases of RTAs whose fundamental structure and principles are based on WTO rules and principles. Is the DSU any less binding if it takes into account the results of a dispute settlement provision of an RTA? A further justification for this view can be found in the wording of the DSU, which makes it plain that the dispute procedure is both compulsory and binding. Article 23 of the DSU conditions a finding of nullification or impairment on having followed the procedures of the Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the Settlement of Disputes. This suggests a procedural monopoly, but does not necessarily rule out a broad definition of WTO law or formally restrain a panel from considering the effect of an RTA.
The problem of WTO-minus commitments 219
Does Article XXIV allow two states to make commitments to each other not to enforce the full rigour of WTO law? When two states can agree to reduce certain tariffs to '0' as between themselves when goods from other WTO Members must face higher bound rates, is this a case of a WTO-minus commitment? Some might say this is simply a case of greater liberalization. 220 But, in other circumstances, can two WTO Members not agree to exempt each other's goods from other WTO requirements provided these measures have no impact on third parties? Unless a narrow definition of 'duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce' is adopted it would seem that they should be able to do so. Arguably, this view runs contrary to the concept of the WTO as providing an irreducible minimum or a floor of obligations below which no WTO Member may go. States can agree in RTAs to heavier burdens than those required by the WTO, such as the elimination of export taxes, 221 but can they not agree between themselves to a lesser standard of treatment such as that entailed when they agree never to apply safeguard measures against each other or agree to the maintenance of discriminatory measures designed to protect cultural industries? XII, XIII, XIV, and XX) are eliminated on substantially all trade…'. If this definition were interpreted restrictively, exceptions to safeguards or other measures, including dispute settlement exceptions, which are not listed, would not be permitted unless they are deemed necessary for the formation of the RTA. Opinions of scholars differ sharply on this point. Some accept a broader definition. 223 Others consider that it cannot include trade remedies. 224 So far, the AB has not adopted a clear position and its decisions on safeguards focus on parallelism without criticizing the practice of not imposing safeguards measures between FTA member states.
The broader issue is posed by general principles of treaty law. Under the WTO treaty acquis, which in principle accepts no reservations on substance and which, in the DSU, requires full submission to the procedure, is it not the case that there can be no release from the duty to submit to the procedures created by the DSU? This would surely be true if Articles XXIV and XX did not exist. Customs unions and FTAs are in fact permitted under the law of the WTO. The attempt to resolve the question by invoking the prohibition on reservations is therefore circular.
The problem of WTO-minus obligations in RTAs may in fact be posed much more starkly under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Recent studies 225 suggest that there is evidence that a considerable proportion of RTAs involving service commitments have chosen to set obligations between parties at levels below those already accepted by the same WTO Members under their GATS schedules. 226 If there is clear evidence of broad use of RTAs to go back on GATS commitments, this is disturbing. But is it impermissible? Given the very vague and unsatisfactory formulation of the GATS Article V, the answer must lie in tightening the wording of the article or increased scrutiny in the CRTA and self-restraint on the part of WTO Members.
Whether it is with respect to goods or services, can the creation of a dispute settlement procedure in an RTA be deemed to be a WTO-minus obligation? This is the real question. When two or more WTO Members establish a special rule between them and agree to settle disputes concerning this rule under the RTA, is this a WTO-minus commitment, which is not permitted by Article XXIV or GATS Article V? One can regret as a matter of policy, but can one object as a matter of law? 227 12. Are 'fork in the road' provisions not well drafted or sufficiently explicit? An intriguing suggestion in the Argentina-Poultry is that the 'fork in the road' provision of the applicable FTA dispute settlement commitment was not sufficiently explicit. 228 This was stated obiter and on further analysis holds little hope of resolving the question. An examination of fork in the road provisions-as in NAFTA-reveals that these provisions are explicit. Efforts could no doubt be made to reword or standardize them, but it is hard to see how they could be made clearer than they are. Furthermore, if it were impossible to opt out of the DSU, then no wording of an FTA would be sufficient to overcome this obstacle. With that said, it interesting to note that Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contains an explicit provision requiring that all disputes involving EU law must be submitted to the Court of Justice of the EU. This provision has seldom been violated, and when it happened in the Mox Plant litigation, the UK and Ireland promptly complied with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision. 229 It is virtually unthinkable that two EU member states would ever submit a dispute over trade in goods or services, raising the same issues in EU and WTO law, to the DSB. But this may have more to do with the strength of EU legal commitments.
13. Is the block procedural, but not substantive? Is it possible that the block on reference to the provisions of an RTA before the DSU is a purely procedural matter? Most of the cases reviewed earlier in this article appear to turn on the procedural difficulties of attempting to avoid proceeding before the DSB or to refer a case to an FTA process. But some cases such as BrazilRetreaded Tyres or US-Softwood Lumber do suggest an attempt to argue that substantively decisions taken under an RTA should be binding or at least persuasive before the DSB.
14. Is the AB concerned about the consequences of making an opening for one FTA on the broader WTO system? It is quite possible that the decisions reviewed above can be explained as much in policy as in legal terms and that the AB is deeply concerned with protecting the integrity of the DSU, in particular, and the force of the WTO legal acquis in general. There is a longstanding and unresolved tension between the establishment of RTAs and respect for the WTO as an institution and as a legal system, which purports to set a minimum standard binding on all WTO Members. As guarantor of WTO law, the AB has a right to take a protective stance vis à vis the massive number of RTAs which have been and continue to be adopted. But does this really justify a stance, B. Arguments in favour of allowing panels to take RTAs into account While it is possible to advance a range of legal and policy reasons for the DSB to refuse to give effect to dispute settlement provisions or decisions taken under RTAs, it is equally possible to advance arguments in favour of the WTO accommodating and giving greater effect to other forms of dispute settlement. Some of the weaknesses of the legal arguments against mutual accommodation have been alluded to in the analysis above. Other arguments in favour of mutual accommodation are set out below.
1. Respect for the logic of Article XXIV Several strong arguments can be based on the text of Article XXIV. The first is that Article XXIV permits RTAs. Limits are set by the Article on the exercise of the authority to establish and maintain RTAs, but there can be no doubt as to the authority given to WTO Members to proceed. Article XXIV.4 could not be more explicit. It is quite possible, as Jackson noted many years ago, 230 that the article has been used more frequently than the drafters of the GATT may have envisaged, but this does not detract from the fact that it exists and that it is explicit. WTO Members have insisted on interpreting WTO law in a manner that adheres to the strict letter of the law; it still behoves these same states then to advance policy arguments against the co-existence of the DSU and dispute settlement provisions of RTAs.
The logic of the text of Article XXIV strongly suggests a policy in favour of allowing what would otherwise be prohibited by Articles I and III et al; the text supports the argument that RTAs can be compatible with the general objective of trade liberalization of the WTO. Not all economists and political scientists 231 or senior members of the WTO Secretariat 232 agree with this position, but they are adopting a stance based on policy, not necessarily on the text of Article XXIV.
Furthermore, the manner and detail in which the Article is drafted and the care taken to set out the conditions governing the creation of RTAs and the safeguards against abuse of this authority, strongly suggest that WTO members enjoy broad latitude in the design and functioning of RTAs. This is supported by the variety of 230 See Jackson, above n 33, at 621. In particular, Jackson notes that the two goals behind the preparatory work of Article XXIV-increasing free trade and allowing less-developed countries to ally themselvesare probably 'inconsistent when applied to specific cases'. He also notes that parties have used Article XXIV to pursue political goals that are inconsistent with the above stated economic goals. He concludes that attempts at reconciling these tensions have largely been achieved by ignoring them. existing RTAs. They range from minimalist bilateral statements of principle 233 covering a few pages to highly detailed FTAs like NAFTA and the China-NZ FTA, 234 to complex regional arrangements such as the MERCOSUR 235 or ASEAN 236 and finally the quasi-federal arrangement of the EU economic and monetary union.
Perhaps most telling of all is the fact that most FTAs and even customs unions are explicitly based on the legal principles that are inherent in the WTO legal acquis. This fact is not only implicit in the 'deep structure' of most RTAs but is expressed explicitly and throughout the treaty texts. To take but one example, NAFTA states that it is drafted in accordance with the principles of the GATT and must also be interpreted in accordance with the same principles. This is not only done both in a general chapter, 237 but also in specific articles 238 and in many schedules and annexes. 239 Similar instances can be cited in a wide range of other RTAs. 240 If the law of RTAs is based on the same principles as the WTO, surely there is a strong argument to be made in favour of seeking to promote principles of co-existence at all levels including-and perhaps especially with respect to-dispute settlement. At the least there should be a degree of mutual trust that would allow the DSB to refer cases back to RTA procedures in appropriate cases. 241 
Effet utile of Article XXIV
The principle of effectiveness has been applied regularly to the texts of WTO law in the sense that every word is deemed to be speaking and must be given meaning. 242 agreements of closer integration…' subject to the provisos of paragraphs 5 and 8. 243 The principle of effectiveness is applied under the WTO in a conservative manner stressing the literal text rather than the broader spirit, unlike under EU law. 244 But when the text itself explicitly authorizes the creation of RTAs and states further that such agreements are conducive to the same goals of trade liberalization, there can be no doubt as to their legitimacy.
It might be argued that since dispute settlement provisions are not explicitly mentioned in Article XXIV, their existence can only be deemed to be implicit in or consequential upon the general authorization and are not explicitly allowed. This is a serious argument as the AB has hesitated to adopt a general doctrine of implicit powers under WTO law. But to the extent that recognition of RTA dispute settlement provisions or the consequences of such provisions reflects the very fact of the existence of an RTA it would seem that this is a matter of explicit rather than implicit powers. If this is the case, the doctrine of the effet utile of WTO law surely suggests the need to respect and harmonize RTA dispute settlement provisions with WTO law. dispute settlement. WTO Members appear to assume that they have broad latitude in designing such provisions and in practice appear to have interpreted their authority liberally. If WTO Members assume that the presence of dispute settlement provisions is a normal phenomenon, they are the collective masters of the treaty. Why should they accept this in one forum and then express such doubt later in the DSB?
4. GATS Article V Does Article V pose essentially the same problems as those arising under Article XXIV? Not necessarily, as the wording of Article V respecting services is, if anything, more vague and difficult to apply than its counterpart respecting goods. There is some justified concern that there is a tendency of WTO Members to use RTAs to reduce their obligations under the GATS. 250 At this point, only the Canada-Autos 251 case has involved arguments attempting to justify service measures as being part of regional agreements, but other cases are almost certain to arise. 252 There is no doubt a legitimate concern that the GATS not be weakened, but it is not clear that this problem in any way controls the legitimacy of recourse to dispute settlement procedures under RTAs.
General Principles of Treaty Law
Modern international law must deal with the co-existence of potentially conflicting multilateral treaties often signed by the same states. On a bilateral basis, the 'last in time rule' can usually resolve difficulties. But in the face of many multilateral treaties with broad but shifting patterns of membership, it would seem more consistent with the needs of the international community to adopt principles of interpretation which promote co-existence rather than conflict. Conflict of law rules in modern private international approach a similar problem in the same spirit. 253 The International Law Commission (ILC) took up the study of the alleged 'fragmentation' of international law, 254 which some saw as the consequence of the emergence of many new international courts and forms of dispute settlement. This phenomenon is clearly present in the field of international trade law. However, the Report did not take the position that the integrity of trade law was threatened. On the contrary, the broad thesis emerging from this Report is that international law is enriched by diversity and a greater number of approaches to dispute settlement.
RTAs are adopted by the same states that are WTO Members. The treaties that they adopt beside the WTO can surely be given fuller effect by recognizing the choices that they have made by adopting additional forms of dispute settlement in RTAs. For the DSB to take the position that such dispute settlement provisions must be trumped by the DSU is to ride roughshod over the choices that the same states have made presumably for good and valid reasons. Once a more specific and explicit commitment has been made by states party to an RTA, they should be held to their commitments not released from them by the DSB, as happened most flagrantly in the Canada-Periodicals case. 255 6. Limitation on the pursuit of regional integration An approach to RTA dispute settlement, which frustrates the efficacy of the procedure, could make it more difficult for the regional partners to pursue regional integration. To take an extreme example: if the Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union were deemed to be contrary to the DSU, insofar as it requires EU Members to resolve their disputes under EU law before the Court of Justice of the European Union, this would be a serious constraint on the development of the EU, as many EU law disputes also raise legal issues of non-discrimination which could go before the DSB. 256 Yet no EU Member has sought to take a dispute involving discriminatory treatment of goods by another EU partner before the DSB. The provisions of other RTAs are less sweeping and categorical: most are 'fork in the road' provisions which suggest that the procedure chosen by the complainant or occasionally the defendant (whether WTO or RTA) will be binding on the parties. 257 Other procedures are more specific such as NAFTA Chapter 19 regarding antidumping/countervailing duty disputes or Chapter 11 disputes involving investorstate arbitration. There is potential for these chapters to involve matters that can also be characterized as disputes arising under the WTO, 258 but they pose no threat to the integrity of the DSU.
On the basis of the experience to date where the DSB has proceeded regardless of the existence of other dispute settlement procedures under RTAs, even rejecting Mexico's argument of forum non conveniens in the taxes on HFCS litigation, it is difficult to claim that the approach taken by the DSB has impeded the formation of other RTAs or even put a chill on the process. WTO Members do not appear to have lost their enthusiasm for RTAs in recent years. This is certainly true for RTAs in general. One possible impact may be to discourage private parties from urging their governments to use general dispute settlement procedures under RTAs. Instead, they may be encouraged to resort to investor-state claims on their own in the hope of a more tangible and rapid result, as was the case respecting the softwood lumber and HFCS claims. Beyond this, the general impact on the formation of RTAs appears to be relatively marginal.
7. False reliance on uniformity and efficacy of a single uniform approach The reaction of the DSB as displayed in the cases reviewed earlier in this article suggests a belief in the advantages of a single and uniform guiding system for international trade law. This reaction is surely questionable. The DSB provides strong and binding guidance as to the application and interpretation of WTO law and in doing so informs the whole body of international trade law which is built into RTAs. This being the case, one can overemphasize the alleged danger of conflicting or contradictory approaches to be taken by RTA dispute settlement panels since they are required to apply the very same principles that are enshrined in the WTO acquis. In the circumstances where they do take a different or even clearly erroneous approaches, the value of having more tribunals and more decisions may well outweigh the risk posed by different approaches. Federal systems survive despite having many different tribunals. But to take the position that panels cannot refer disputes to the relevant RTA procedure on the ground that the WTO is inherently superior or provides uniformity of approach to all disputes is surely to place too much confidence in a single procedure. Monopoly is very seldom the best approach to dispute settlement when local conditions and sensitivities may vary so much from region to region. Where RTA Members have made particular procedural or substantive choices in their agreements, to assert a monopoly of the WTO process does not necessarily provide the best solution tailored to local choices and conditions. The ECJ (now the Court of Justice of the European Union) began its work assuming that it needed to assert a monopoly, but has subsequently found that it could do its work effectively while making room for the contributions of the courts of Member States of the EU. 259 The ILC Report on the problems posed by fragmentation of international law does not endorse a single approach.
Could Brazil-Retreaded Tyres provide the beginning of a valid justification?
It is possible to interpret the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres as reflecting a more open approach to RTA dispute settlement than that previously adopted by the AB. This decision is of great interest both for what it said concerning the legitimacy of measures of environmental protection and also with respect to its consideration of decisions taken by Brazil pursuant to the MERCOSUR disputes settlement provisions. In this case, the panel and the AB considered Brazil's arguments on the measures it took to allow imports of retreaded tyres from other MERCOSUR parties, while at the same time banning imports of the same products from other WTO Members. For the Panel, the MERCOSUR ruling provided a reasonable basis to enact the MERCO-SUR exemption, with the implication that the resulting discrimination was not arbitrary. 260 The AB, taking a more nuanced approach, considered that a binding regional dispute settlement decision under the MERCOSUR might in appropriate circumstances constitute sufficient justification of an import ban, but held that, in this case, Brazil's stated objective was to protect the environment and not to comply with a legal decision. Hence, the AB found that Brazil 261 could not rely on the RTA decision. The Panel and AB reviewed the Brazilian argument at some length and showed much less reserve in the face of Brazil's plea based on MERCOSUR decisions then with respect to Canada's attempt to plead various NAFTA Chapter 19 decisions in the US-Softwood Lumber litigation.
The Role of Article XX
The Brazil-Retreaded Tyres report suggests that an RTA dispute settlement decision may function as justification of an exception to the normal rules of the GATT. What the case assumes, and which is not discussed at length, is why it is necessary to refer to Article XX at all. Article XXIV is already a complex article and one may ask whether it does not provide justification in itself of recourse to dispute settlement under and RTA. However, several decisions have invoked Article XX and it is not likely that the AB will alter its approach in this regard.
Other systems manage to be more open ended-why not WTO law?
International trade law is in the somewhat anomalous situation of having an extremely powerful system of dispute settlement in the WTO. Arguably this is the most effective and binding international dispute settlement system currently in existence for the 159 WTO Members. Without necessarily wishing to abandon the many advantages of the current system it is still possible to suggest that it would not be weakened by showing greater deference to the choices made by WTO Members which are also parties to RTAs. Arguably what is required is greater willingness on the part of the DSB to ensure complete coordination between the DSU and comparable provisions of RTAs. International law recognizes that states frequently make overlapping and apparently contradictory commitments, and does much to ensure the ongoing co-existence of these commitments. Surely a similar effort is possible in the field of international trade law.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no simple answer to the question of the relationship between the dispute settlement provisions of the DSU and RTAs. Some aspects of this question are more readily explained than others and much depends on context and the facts of the particular situation in which it arises. However, it does appear that a more nuanced approach might be possible in defining the relationship between the DSU and the dispute settlement provisions of RTAs. A number of trade law experts have considered the issues in recent years 262 and most appear to consider that the current situation is not satisfactory.
On the principle-much respected by the AB-that every word of a treaty must be given effect, it is surely reasonable to ask the DSB to make greater efforts to respect the choices made by WTO Members in the context of RTAs. There will doubtless be situations where direct conflicts arise and where the DSB will have no choice but to apply WTO law only. But it is surely not too much to ask that a greater effort be made by panels and the AB to avoid conflicts. Nor is it too much to ask that panels and the AB be more willing to examine the results of litigation under RTAs, which create binding obligations for RTA parties. One important avenue offering greater flexibility by the DSB would be to accept a broader definition of WTO law. The concern that the DSB is only empowered to apply WTO law can be considerably alleviated if it is recognized that WTO law is the source of a great deal of the law and legal principles governing RTAs. Furthermore a broader definition of WTO law, comprising general principles of law and the rules of public international law binding on all states would correspond to the reality of contemporary international legal theory and treaty interpretation espoused by leading publicists. 263 The WTO legal texts will doubtless continue to be approached in a careful and conservative fashion but there is no reason why they should be divorced from modern treaty interpretation.
The case for this approach is based on GATT Article XXIV and on the fact that significant accommodations have been made by WTO Members to allow for the existence of some 400 RTAs. The review process under the Transparency Mechanisms has accepted dispute settlement provisions in RTAs without comment or objection. A number of disputes concerning the operation of the commitment in RTAs to exempt member states from the operation of safeguard measures have set conditions for the exercise of the exemption but have not questioned the exemption itself. In some disputes, panels and the AB appear to have been unwilling to take into consideration obligations under RTAs flowing from dispute settlement decisions. However, in the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres case, the panel and the AB both showed greater flexibility in the face of a MERCOSUR tribunal decision than had been the case before. In the final analysis, it does not seem appropriate that one party to an RTA can avoid its obligations under the regional agreement by referring a dispute to the WTO in circumstances where it has special obligations under the RTA.
Nevertheless, there do remain significant difficulties in the way of reconciling WTO and RTA dispute settlement. The manner in which the AB accepted that it was not possible to decline to rule on a matter and to refer a case back to dispute settlement under an RTA suggests a well-entrenched position which will not be easy to change. Perhaps even more complex is the problem posed by the wording of the 'fork in the road' provisions of many RTAs. Most of these provisions leave the choice to the complainant, so that if the complainant has chosen the WTO the defendant has no means of stopping the process under the terms of the choice of forum clause. Only a few provisions leave the choice of forum to the defendant. 264 If the case arises, will these choices be respected by the DSB? 265 Apart from the position of principle taken by the AB that a WTO Member cannot be denied its recourse under the DSU, there is the added problem stemming from the choice of forum clause. Similarly, once the DSB has framed the dispute and appointed a panel, it may be very difficult for a party to seek to alter what can be characterized as the essence of the dispute. It may well be that these matters can only be raised and decided either before the dispute is framed or as a preliminary matter before the formal process begins before a panel.
Services are looming larger in recent WTO disputes and it is probable that they will also give rise to disputes involving RTA procedures. Although this is not clear it seems that the issues of principle are similar with respect to goods and services disputes.
Having said this, if one reflects on what happened in the Canada-Periodicals case there can be very little excuse for a dispute settlement procedure which purports to be blind to the equities of a situation where two states have bargained in good faith and reached an agreement in an RTA exempting certain measures from the general rules, only to have the other party upset the bargain by referring the dispute to the WTO. This is more than a theoretical argument, it has happened, and the increasingly complex co-existence of the WTO with some 400 RTAs suggests that similar problems can arise in the future and should be dealt with in a manner more consonant with fairness and legal principle. 
